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Abstract 
In this paper we examine a comprehensive set of 2,499 UK IPOs launched between 
mid-1975 and the end of 2004.  We find compelling evidence of long run under-
performance that persists for between 36 and 60 months post-flotation, depending on 
the precise method chosen to measure abnormal returns.  Following Schultz (2003), 
we ask whether our results are consistent with “pseudo-timing”.  Equally-weighted 
returns in calendar time provide further evidence of under-performance, a result that 
favours the Loughran and Ritter (2000) behavioural timing hypothesis rather than the 
Schultz (2003) pseudo-timing hypothesis.  However, we show that this under-
performance is concentrated in AIM and USM stocks. When we measure value-
weighted returns in calendar time we find that abnormal returns are not significantly 
different from zero.  Further analysis shows that, consistent with the findings of other 
studies, IPO under-performance is concentrated in smaller firms.  
 
JEL Classifications: G14; G32 
 
All errors remain the responsibility of the authors 
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UK IPOs: Long Run Returns, Behavioural Timing and Pseudo 
Timing 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Recently, US evidence on the under-performance of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
(Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995, 2000) has been challenged on two counts.  
First, the validity of the assumptions inherent in event time methodologies (e.g. 
Mitchell and Stafford, 2000) has been questioned.  This is important, as the evidence 
for the UK and elsewhere potentially seems to differ depending on whether calendar 
time methods or event time methods are used (e.g. Espenlaub et al., 2000).  The 
second challenge comes from the “pseudo timing” hypothesis of Schultz (2003).  
Pseudo-timing is Schultz’s term for the situation where managers of firms, believing 
markets are inefficient, react to market-wide pricing conditions by issuing equity (or 
launching an IPO) even though in reality market prices are efficient.  This stands in 
marked contrast to the Loughran and Ritter (2000) hypothesis where market prices are 
assumed to be inefficient, a condition that is exploited by managers knowingly issuing 
over-valued equity.  Under the Loughran and Ritter story, the observed under-
performance of IPOs (and seasoned equity offerings, SEOs) is real and the result of 
managers successfully exploiting market mispricing.  However, the Schultz version of 
events is entirely different.  Here, managers merely observe market prices and adjust 
the supply of IPOs so that there are more offerings following price rises (and less 
following price falls).  They have zero market timing ability.  Using a simple 
simulation model, Schultz shows that under such conditions, an event time 
methodology falsely leads to a conclusion of market timing ability, because the 
number of events observed is not an exogenous variable, but rather one that depends 
on the level of the market in the first place.  Thus, we will observe significant 
negative returns in event time, which will lead us to (falsely) conclude that managers 
have market timing ability.  However, calendar time returns are not so affected, 
leading Schultz to prefer calendar time tests to event time tests.  Schultz reports that 
the significant event-time negative returns for US IPOs become much closer to zero 
and insignificant when calculated on a calendar time basis.  Support for the Schultz 
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hypothesis can be found in Butler et al. (2005), but counter-evidence emerges in 
Baker et al. (2006) and Chan et al. (2007). 
 
Approval of the calendar time approach is not universal.  Loughran and Ritter (2000) 
argue that the use of value-weighted returns and calendar time returns will result in 
extremely weak tests if managers do, in fact, possess behavioural timing ability when 
making corporate financing decisions.  Second, from a statistical testing viewpoint, 
whilst the use of calendar time portfolios is advocated by Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000) and by Fama (1998), who notes that it mitigates the effects of the “bad model” 
problem and also argues that most of the apparent anomalies found in the literature 
disappear or become less significant when abnormal returns are estimated in calendar 
time, the main disadvantage is that it does not reflect investor experience as well as 
the event-time approach.  A recent paper by Liu and Strong (2008) warns against the 
general danger of drawing false inferences from market-based studies.  Although that 
paper was concerned primarily with single month partitioning of longer period 
returns, the biases they discuss are implicit in the calendar time portfolio approach. 
Whether value-weighting or equal weighting is employed, the implied portfolio 
rebalancing inherent in a calendar time approach could give rise to the biases noted by 
the authors, and in addition result in portfolios which seem implausible from an 
investor point of view.  Furthermore, both Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000) recognise that a potential problem with the calendar time approach is that 
changing the number of firms in the calendar time portfolio through time has the 
potential to create residual heteroscedasticity that can affect inferences about the 
coefficients.  A further problem with a factor approach to calendar time portfolios is 
that the method imposes the requirement that the factor loadings are constant, even 
though the portfolio composition changes radically over the period of the study.  
Nonetheless, both Lyon et al. (1999) and Dichev and Piotroski (2001) recommend 
that buy-and-hold returns and calendar-time regressions ought to be considered as 
complements rather than substitutes.  In this paper we follow that advice, and report 
both calendar time and event time returns.  However, we employ new methods in the 
calendar time portfolios to take account of possible heteroscedasticity in portfolio 
returns. 
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Our objectives in this research are several fold.  First, in employing by far the most 
comprehensive data set of UK IPOs investigated to date, covering 2,499 IPOs floated 
on the London market between January 1975 and December 2004, we are able to lay 
to rest any hints that results from previous UK study may have been time period and 
sample specific.  Results for the UK that broadly confirm the US findings outlined 
above are reported by Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), Levis (1993) and Goergen, 
Khurshed and Mudambi (2007).  These authors confirmed that underperformance of 
UK IPOs extend over 36 full months after the first day of issue.  In particular Levis 
(1993) suggested that the long-term underperformance extends beyond the 36 
months.
1
  Recent evidence on the UK is provided by Espenlaub, Gregory, and Tonks 
(2000).
2
  However, they point out that tests of underperformance may be sensitive to 
the choice of empirical method used to measure performance.  Abnormal returns over 
a three year period after the offerings were significant and negative irrespective of the 
benchmark employed in their event-time approach, though over a five year period the 
underperformance was less dramatic and sensitive to the benchmark employed. This 
study plays an important role in extending the time period examined in these studies 
back to 1975 and forward to the end of 2004. 
 
Second, in employing the BHAR methods of Lyon et al. (1999) with control 
portfolios calculated according to the principles set out in Liu and Strong (2008), we 
are able to calculate abnormal returns that could actually have been achieved by 
investors systematically buying new IPO issues.  Despite the well-known problems of 
cumulated abnormal returns (CARs), we nonetheless note results from such a method 
for completeness.  Third, we employ a more sophisticated bootstrapping approach to 
estimating the significance levels of the BHARs than the simple bootstrapping 
method of Lyon et al. (1999).  Fourth, we directly examine the timing issue in order to 
test whether the data suggest any evidence of market timing, either “pseudo” or 
behavioural. Fifth, despite our reservations about the realism of abnormal returns 
derived from calendar time methods, by employing them we are able to shed light on 
whether managers of IPO firms appear to have genuine market timing ability, or 
                                                
1
 Levis’s (1993) results were based on a sample of 712 issues from 1980-1988. 
2
 They use a sample of 588 UK IPO firms over the period 1985 to 1992.  Their study compares 
abnormal performance based on five alternative benchmarks using both event-time approach and 
calendar –time approach. 
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whether they are exhibiting the characteristics associated with “pseudo-timing”.  
Sixth, we separately analyse the performance of Main Market, Unlisted Securities 
Market (USM) and Alternative Investment Market (AIM) stocks.  Last, we employ 
some innovative approaches to the problem of heteroscedasticity in calendar time 
portfolio returns. 
 
The paper now proceeds as follows.  The first section gives the usual description of 
data and research methods.  The second section discusses the results obtained from 
event period returns analysis.  The third section examines the timing issue, the fourth 
shows the results from calendar time approaches, and the final section examines the 
results according to size and market of listing effects.   
 
Data and research method 
IPO data 
A comprehensive sample of UK IPOs from January 1975 to December 2004 was 
collected from the London Stock Database Price (LSPD), using the LSPD “birth 
marker” to identify the nature of the IPO.  A total of 433 IPOs were then excluded 
from the sample because they are identified as investment trusts, finance companies, 
or banks, leaving a final sample of 2499 IPOs of ordinary shares by firms on the 
London Stock Exchange.
3
  In addition we require that stock price/return data for 
issuers and market capitalisation data must be available on the London Share Price 
Database. 
 
The listing methods in the sample, as defined by the LSPD G8 codes, comprise 
placements (81.3%), offers for sale at fixed price (11.5%), offer for sale by tenders 
(2.1%), and offer for sale by subscriptions (1%), placing combined with open offer 
(0.6%), placing combined with intermediaries offer (0.5%), and lastly placing 
combined with offer for sale (3%).  Table 1 shows the distribution of the IPOs by type 
and by year.  The table reveals that there is considerable time variation in the number 
                                                
3
 The exclusion of such firms is typical of the literature (e.g. Espenlaub et al, 2000; Goergen et al, 
2007).  However, our results are similar if we include banks and financial stocks. 
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of IPOs, with peaks occurring in the pattern of IPOs.  The more recent increase in 
numbers coincides with the opening of the AIM market on the LSE.   
[Table 1 about here] 
Calculation of abnormal returns 
We measure returns for IPOs and the control sample of firms using monthly returns 
from the London Share Price Database (LSPD).  The market capitalisations of all 
firms in January of each year were also obtained from the LSPD database.  We 
measure event time abnormal returns using two metrics.  Our main method is the Buy 
and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR): 
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where τ  is the period of investment in months commencing at the start of the month 
following flotation,
4
 itR  is the return on security i in month t.  The benchmark 
return, bitR , is formed in three ways: our first (and preferred) method is to use decile 
reference portfolios, constructed as described below.  Two variants of this approach 
are employed: an equally weighted control portfolio and a value-weighted one.  The 
BHAR derived from these benchmarks represents the abnormal return on the portfolio 
of IPOs compared to that of an equivalently size-controlled passive investment 
portfolio with no monthly rebalancing.  Although we have a strong preference for 
control portfolios, we also report a third version of the BHAR results using a 
matched-firm approach.  For the matched-firm control an IPO firm that went public in 
a given year is matched by a listed firm with the closest available market 
capitalisation at January of the same year.  For an IPO firm that does not have a 
matching firm the returns of which last for the whole test period, we substitute the 
returns of the next available size-matched firm at the point of delisting.  By necessity, 
this involves the effective re-balancing of the control portfolio. 
 
                                                
4 As an anonymous referee has pointed out, this is a standard practice in the literature and excluding the 
month of the issue itself minimises the impact of any initial under-pricing and underwriter price 
support in immediate after-trading.  It has the further advantage of ensuring that the returns measured 
in this paper would have been realisable by investors.  Including first day returns would capture returns 
only to the group of investors who received a full allocation of stock in the issue. 
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When the estimation of abnormal returns is based on a benchmark, such a benchmark 
should, in principle, match the characteristics of the event firm as closely as possible. 
Lyon et al. (1999) emphasised that a careful construction of reference portfolios 
should be made to eliminate the new listing and rebalancing biases.  The benchmark 
and the event portfolio should, in principle, be a plausible and investable opportunity 
set, in accordance with Liu and Strong (2008).  Thus our main benchmark is based 
upon initial value-weightings.  However, we also check our results against an equally 
weighted benchmark, as if IPOs are in general of average size within their deciles, 
such a benchmark may be viewed as more appropriate than a value-weighted 
benchmark.  Our reference, or benchmark, portfolios are purged of 5 year IPO firms 
listed in London stock exchange market during the period of study (January 1975-
December 2007), as suggested by Loughran and Ritter (2000).  Our choice of size-
decile control portfolios, rather than size and book-to-market portfolios, follows 
Loughran and Ritter (2000).  Besides the “behavioural timing” arguments put forward 
by Loughran and Ritter, there is a further practical reason for not using book-to-
market controls in a UK context.  Whereas the LSPD data is comprehensive, covering 
returns and market capitalisations for all UK stocks, the same is not true of 
Datastream or any other UK source of book-to-market values.  Some firms simply 
have missing book values (this is particularly true for the early years of our sample) 
but for some sectors Datastream does not have market-to-book ratios.  To construct 
the size control portfolios, each year all UK firms are ranked according to their 
market capitalisation in January, and decile portfolio are constructed with equal 
number of firms in each decile.  The return for each size control portfolio is then 
tracked from January of year t for τ  months, with the returns being value-weighted 
according to their initial market capitalisations.  These control portfolios do not 
therefore require re-balancing and follow the principles set out in Liu and Strong 
(2008).  Each IPO is then assigned a control portfolio based on its market 
capitalisation, defined as the offering price times the number of shares outstanding at 
the first day of trading.   
 
A further problem that we confront both in the IPO sample and the benchmark 
portfolio sample is that of firms that de-list within the 60 month measurement period.  
Liu and Strong (2008, p.2255) replace de-listed firm returns by either zero or the risk-
free rate.  They find similar results in both cases.  Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) and 
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Mitchell and Stafford (2000, p.298) replace all de-listed firms by the benchmark 
return.  This has the potential to create an upward bias in the estimated BHAR returns, 
since some of these de-listings are bankruptcies.  While CRSP deals with de-listings 
by accounting for the final return, including bankruptcies, not all of these effects of 
bankruptcies are actually taken into account.  First, some of these corrections are 
made several months or even several years after any de-listing.  Second, a proportion 
of de-listed returns remain ‘missing’ permanently in CRSP.
5
  While CRSP record a 
final return based upon the firm’s worth at delisting, the LSPD does not provide such 
a service.  Under LSPD, de-listed firms have a missing value, although the reason for 
delisting is recorded.  In computing BHAR returns, de-listed firms were treated on the 
basis of the following rule.  If a de-listed firm has preserved its value (such as a 
merger or an acquisition), we replace the return of that firm by the return of the 
benchmark.  If the delisting is due to a total loss of value (bankruptcy), we replace the 
return by -1.  In making this distinction, we use the LSPD G10 description.  The most 
important codes are 7, 16, 20 and 21.  As can be seen from the description in 
Appendix 1, these types of delisting are most likely to be stocks that are either 
worthless or a long way from giving shareholders any terminal value, and so we treat 
these cases as if investors lost all their investment.  By contrast, the remaining types 
of de-listing would seem to be value preserving. 
 
Test statistics in event time 
For each τ  we calculate the conventional t-statistic as 
NBHAR
RAHB
t
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τ
τ
σ
=        (2) 
where τRAHB  is the (cross sectional) sample mean, )( τσ iBHAR  is the cross-
sectional standard deviation, and N  is the number of IPO firms.  Because the data is 
likely to be skewed, we correct for skewness using Johnson’s (1978) correction 
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where γˆ  is the coefficient of skewness, and )(/ ττ σ iBHARRAHBS = .  This 
adjustment was advocated by Lyon et al. (1999) because of the suspected skewness of 
                                                
5 http://www.crsp.chicagogsb.edu/resources/files/crsp_white_paper_delist_returns.pdf 
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BHAR returns.  They use the standard bootstrap procedure with bootstrap sample size 
of 4/N .  However, this standard bootstrap does not address the questions of cross-
sectional correlation and heteroscedasticity.  To our knowledge, the first problem 
cannot be addressed in a cross-sectional test, and although Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000, pp 304-6) argue for t-statistics corrected for cross-sectional dependence these 
are not t-statistics that are simultaneously corrected for skewness.  In any event, 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) have a strong preference for calendar time methods to 
allow for cross-sectional correlation.  Neither is the second problem of 
heteroscedasticity addressed by the ordinary bootstrap.  We advocate the use of the 
wild bootstrap instead.  This procedure has the merit that it preserves the first and 
second moments of the parent distribution.  The difference between the ordinary and 
wild bootstrap is simple.  Let the residuals from a regression be iεˆ  (in our 
case RAHBBHARii −=εˆ ).  In the regular bootstrap we resample by drawing 
NN <*  residuals, *ˆiε ,  with replacement from the series iεˆ .  In the wild bootstrap we 
create the bootstrap residuals *ˆiε  as the product of the original residuals and an 
independent random variable, iη , with zero mean and unit variance.  This guarantees 
that the bootstrap variance will be the same as that of the parent distribution.  For 
example, iη  can be standard normal and hence  
0)ˆ()()ˆ( * == iii EEE εηε  and )ˆ()ˆ()()ˆ(
*
iiii VVVV εεηε ==  
However, if the data is skewed, re-sampling based on the standard normal will yield 
zero skewness since 0)( 3 =iE η .  To preserve skewness, Liu (1988) and Mammen 
(1993) suggest ways of obtaining 1)( 3 =iE η .  One suggestion is 
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will not preserve the kurtosis of the parent distribution since 2)( 4 =iE η .  An 
alternative scheme (see Davidson et al. (2007)) is to use 
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This will preserve mean, variance and kurtosis ( 0)( =iE η , and 1)()(
42 == ii EE ηη ) 
but not skewness ( 0)( 3 =iE η ).  Achieving both preservations is not possible. 
Davidson et al. (2007) suggest some combination that will achieve partial refinement. 
However, here we advocate combining the skewness adjusted t-statistic with the 
kurtosis preserving wild bootstrap.  Assuming that the skewness adjustment of 
Johnson (1978) is reasonably accurate, the parent distribution of the adjusted statistic 
will be expected to be symmetric.  Therefore, achieving 1)( 4 =iE η  will be more 
important than achieving 1)( 3 =iE η .  Accordingly, we adopt this combined Skewness-
Adjusted and Kurtosis Preserving Bootstrap approach in our tests. 
 
Calendar time methodology 
When calculating returns in calendar time, we have the choice between measuring 
returns relative to a risk-controlled benchmark, or using a regression-based 
framework.  We can usefully summarise all the approaches used to estimate abnormal 
returns as follows.  Let tR ,τ  be a time series of a portfolio of IPO returns of 
companies that were born within the previous τ months.  In general, calendar time 
tests can be seen as testing for the significance of α  in a time series model  
t
E
tt RR εα ττ ++= )( ,,        (4) 
where EtR )( ,τ  is the required return and tε  is a zero mean disturbance term.  We can 
think of this expected return either in terms of a factor model (for example the CAPM 
or the Fama-French three factor model) or some benchmark, btR , where the 
benchmark is matched on the basis of firm-specific characteristics, such as market 
capitalisation.  If we write expected return as:      
 )()( , ftbtft
E
t RRRR −+= βτ       (5) 
we can then view the simple CTAR as being a special case that has the additional 
restriction that 1=β .  Lyon et al. (1999, p. 197) emphasise that such simple CTAR 
methods appear to be better specified (and more conservative) than the Fama-French 
three factor approach, “suspecting” that the former “generally dominates” the latter 
for two reasons: first, the assumed linearity in factor exposures inherent in the Fama-
French model in calendar time; second, the problem of interactions between the 
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factors.  Mitchell and Stafford (2000, p.321) also favour the CTAR methodology 
rather than the Fama-French regression-based approach, noting that because it suffers 
from fewer statistical flaws “more faith should be placed in these results”.  An 
additional concern for UK researchers is that it is far from clear that the Fama-French 
model is entirely appropriate in a UK context.  Issues raised include the questions of 
whether the model adequately describes the cross-section of expected returns in the 
UK, whether other factors (such as R&D expenditure to market value) may actually 
dominate the Fama-French factors in the explanation of this cross-section, and 
whether results may anyway be highly sensitive to the precise construction of the 
factors (Gregory, Harris and Michou, 2001; Al-Horani, Pope and Stark, 2006; 
Michou, Mouselli and Stark, 2007).  For these reasons there seems to be little reason 
to favour calendar time regressions based upon a Fama-French model, and so we do 
not report results on this basis.   
 
In more general terms we can think of (5) as a model that allows for some variation 
between the characteristics of the benchmark portfolio and the characteristics of the 
IPO portfolio.  If the benchmark perfectly matches the risk characteristics of the IPO 
portfolio, then β  should be unity.  However, if the IPO portfolio has more or less risk 
than the benchmark 
6
, then allowing β  to vary can take account of this.  The 
approach is not new, for example the same model is employed in an investigation of 
UK IPOs by Espenlaub, Gregory and Tonks (2000), but a further advantage of the 
regression approach, not previously exploited in the literature, is that it allows more 
sophisticated approaches to the well-known problem of heteroscedasticity (Mitchell 
and Stafford, 2000) in calendar time portfolios to be accommodated.  The first, and 
most simple approach to the problem that we employ is the estimation of robust 
standard errors using White (1980) corrections.  The alternative approach is to use 
GLS.  Assuming an equally weighted portfolio and that all returns are iid at time t, a 
τ -month holding period portfolio return is obtained as 
, ( )
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6
 For example, the mean IPO firm does not have exactly the same mean market capitalisation as the 
benchmark. 
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where tn ,τ  is the number of firms in the portfolio and 
)(τ
itR  is the return of a firm i  
that was born within the last τ  months. 
The variance of this portfolio is 
 22
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So even under the unrealistic assumption that returns are iid, the portfolio variance 
will be time varying and will depend on the number of IPO stocks included in the 
portfolio.  Unfortunately, the portfolio variance will probably be more complex than 
(7) because asset returns are not iid. 
 
When heteroscedasticity has a simple form as in (7), one way of dealing with this 
problem is to standardise the residuals such that they have a constant variance.  For 
example, in a simple regression like 
 tbtt uRR ++= βατ ,  
If 2)( ttuVar ω= , then we can use the fact that 1)/( =ttuVar ω  and standardise the 
equation above by dividing the whole equation by tω .  GLS involves replacing the 
unknown ω  with some estimate.  One simple case is to set tt n ,/1 τω = .  This is 
identical to Mitchell and Stafford’s (2000) suggestion of estimating
7
  
 )(, tbtttt uRnRn ++= βατ  
 
A more flexible approach would be to estimate the variance, since we do not know its 
exact form.  Here, we assume that it is a linear function of the number of the firms 
entering the portfolio.  Thus, we assume that the variance can be approximated by 
some function of tn10
ˆˆ δδ + .  To ensure that the variance is positive we set 
)ˆˆexp()(ˆ 10 ttt nuraV δδ += . To operationalise this we first obtain the unrestricted 
residuals tuˆ  from  
                                                
7
 However, the authors argue against this transformation since it “completely defeats the purpose of 
forming calendar-time portfolios” (p.317).  Instead, they use a bootstrapping procedure to compute 
critical values. 
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 tbtt uRR ++= βατ ,  
Then estimate the regression  
 
ttt errornu ++= )log()ˆlog( 10
2 δδ  
Finally, we set ))log(ˆˆexp()(ˆ 10 tt nuraV δδ += .  As we show below, the GLS 
formulation appears to offer a better fit in terms of adjusted R-squared statistics, 
although the inferences from both the GLS and OLS with robust (White (1980) 
corrected) standard errors are broadly similar. 
 
Results 
Buy and hold returns in event time 
Our first results, presented in Table 2, show the BHARs derived from an equally-
weighted size decile control portfolio.  We report the returns from all markets, 
excluding privatisations, in this Table.  Panels A to C then report the results from the 
use of an equally weighted, value weighted and size control firm respectively.  The 
BHAR in Panel A falls from an insignificant +0.8% after 6 months to -3.4% 
(significant at the 5% level) after 12 months, becoming highly significant thereafter 
and continuing to fall to -10.8% after 24 months, -16.4% after 36 months, -29.2% 
after 48 months and -47.6% after 60 months.
8
  All abnormal returns are skewed and 
leptokurtic.  It is worth recording that the IPO buy and hold return itself is highly 
skewed and leptokurtic throughout the period, and that the benchmark is also skewed 
and leptokurtic, but to a lesser extent.  We also report medians, and note that the 
median performance is considerably worse than the mean throughout.  Our wild 
bootstrap test statistic should adequately deal with outliers, but as a test of whether 
outliers are influencing the performance we Winsorise the abnormal returns at the 1% 
and 99% levels, reporting a truncated mean and a t-test based upon the truncated 
BHARs.  The truncated mean is less negative than the overall mean, but is highly 
significant.  Truncated mean BHARs are -11.3% after 36 months and -30.8% after 60 
months. 
                                                
8
 Note that our IPOs are observed up until the end of 2004.  However, at the time of writing LSPD 
returns were only available until end 2007.  Thus whilst the 36 month BHARs can be calculated for all 
stocks, the full 48 month and 60 month BHARs can only be estimated for IPOs that took place up until 
the end of 2003 and the end of 2002 respectively. 
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Panel B of Table 2 shows the results from a comparison against the value-weighted 
size-decile control portfolios.  In general, the BHARs are smaller in absolute value 
than those obtained with an equally weighted benchmark.  Again the BHAR is 
insignificantly positive after 6 months, falling to a marginally significant -3.0% after 
12 months.  Beyond 12 months the rate of decline accelerates, with abnormal returns 
reaching -9.2% after 2 years, -12.6% after 3 years, -19.5% after 4 years and -31.6% 
after 5 years.  The skewness and kurtosis of the BHARs is greater than under the 
equally weighted benchmark, the difference being attributable to the smaller levels of 
skewness and kurtosis found in the value-weighted control portfolio compared to 
those of the equally-weighted portfolio.  As with the equally weighted benchmark, 
medians are more negative than the means.  However, the truncated means are smaller 
in terms of absolute value, and although generally significant, this is not the case for 
the 30 and 36 month BHARs.  However, after 36 months the truncated mean falls and 
becomes increasingly significant, reaching a highly significant -19.7% for the 60 
month BHAR.  
 
Finally, in Panel C we present the results from matching against a control firm 
portfolio.  Although the pattern of abnormal returns is consistent with those from the 
other two methods, we note that the abnormal returns here are considerably larger in 
terms of absolute magnitude, being -7.7% after 12 months, -30.1% after 36 months, 
and a massive -69% after 60 months.  These abnormal returns have considerably less 
skewness and kurtosis than is found under the portfolio-control methods.  However, 
the reason for this is that the matched firms themselves have (buy and hold) returns 
that are highly skewed and leptokurtic.  Last, medians and truncated means are 
smaller in absolute magnitude than the overall means, but are still highly significant. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Whilst one might take comfort from the fact that all three benchmarks lead to a 
statistically consistent conclusion, the large differences in the size of the BHARs is 
troubling.  As a robustness check on these figures, we calculated a conventional 
cumulative abnormal return using the value-weighted size benchmark.  The CARs 
turn out to be smaller in magnitude than the BHARs, but remain significant at all 
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horizons greater than 6 months using either a simple t-test or our wild bootstrap 
alternative.  Although the problems of positive bias in CARs are well known (e.g. 
Kothari and Warner, 1997) there is a hint in the comparison between the CARs and 
BHARs of the compounding problem argument of Fama (1998), Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000), and Gompers and Learners (2003) where the buy-and hold return 
method can magnify underperformance, even if it occurs in only a single sub-period.   
 
Sub-analysis of performance based upon listing market 
Both the USM and the AIM had, or have, less onerous entry requirements than those 
that apply to firms listing on the main market.  In particular, the trading history of 
such firms is shorter and the average market capitalisation of firms on these markets is 
smaller.  Goergen et al. (2007) show that smaller firms have different long run 
performance characteristics.  This motivates the partitioning of our sample into Main 
Market, AIM and USM firms.
9
  The long run performance of these categories is 
shown in Tables 3, 4, and 5 respectively.  In all cases, Panels A to C follow the 
benchmarks for Table 2, i.e. Panel A reports results against an equally weighted 
benchmark, Panel B against a value weighted benchmark, and Panel C against a size-
matched firm benchmark.  Of our sample of 2,499 firms, 50.2% list on the main 
market, 39.6% list on AIM, and 10.2% list on the USM. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Turning first to the main market, results vary according to the benchmark selected.  
Using an equally weighted benchmark (Table 3, Panel A), returns start off as being 
significantly positive under the equally weighted metric at the one and two year 
horizons (the latter being 4.3%, significant at the 10% level), before tailing off to a 
highly significant -19.2% after 60 months.  The median is substantially below the 
mean for all horizons, although we note that the truncated mean is not significantly 
different from zero.  When the value-weighted benchmark is used (Panel B), none of 
the longer horizon returns are significantly different from zero, although the medians 
are large and negative, and only the 6 month returns is significantly positive.  Finally, 
when the size-matched benchmark is employed, returns at horizons beyond 36 months 
                                                
9
 Note that we do not include UK privatisations in any of these Tables, and do not report the returns to 
privatisations for reasons of space.  However, we note that applying the same approach to privatisations 
results in significant positive returns to investors. 
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(42 months in the case of the truncated mean) are significantly negative.  Given this 
ambiguity between the metrics, it is hard to conclude that the long run performance of 
main market IPOs is reliably different from zero.  This suggests that the overall 
results in reported in Table 2 are driven by AIM and USM IPOs. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Turning first to AIM, in Table 4 we see clear evidence of substantial and highly 
significant negative performance by AIM IPOs, whichever metric is employed.  In 
Panel A, using the equally weighted metric, buy and hold abnormal returns range 
from -11% after 12 months, to -43.3% after 36 months and -111.7% after 60 months.  
Using our value-weighted benchmark, the abnormal returns for these periods are -
9.6%, -36.1% and -74% respectively.  Finally, Panel C employs the size-matched firm 
benchmark and yields results of -16.9%, -60.6% and -172.1% for the 12, 36 and 60 
month periods.  Neither medians nor truncated means suggest that any of these results 
are being driven by outliers, with the truncated means following a similar pattern to 
the means, being significant at all horizons greater than 12 months.  In short, the 
performance of AIM IPOs is extremely poor. 
One way that we can test whether our results for AIM are reflective of the nature of 
firms that float on more lightly regulated markets is to look at its predecessor, the 
USM.  The USM started in 1980 and was wound up in 1996, effectively being made 
irrelevant by changes in listing rules and the introduction of AIM in 1995, with the 
number of USM IPOs falling away sharply in the 1990s as the difference between 
USM and Main Market listing requirement narrowed.   The results for USM IPOs are 
presented in Table 5. When we examine the BHARs of USM stocks we see a similar 
pattern to that which emerges for AIM stocks.  At all horizons beyond 6 months, 
returns are substantial and negative.  Indeed, after 60 months these abnormal returns 
are well in excess of -100% whichever metric is used.  As in the case of the AIM 
stocks, neither medians nor means suggest that these large negative abnormal returns 
are attributable to an outlier effect  This leads us to inspect the data more closely to 
see what might be driving these abnormal returns.  A key reason that emerges is that a 
substantial percentage of firms that list on the USM were delisted for reasons that can 
be classified as liquidation or administrative receivership.  Table 6 shows the detailed 
breakdown of this rate of attrition according to the market of listing.  After 36 months, 
1.2% of Main Market IPOs have delisted for this reason, compared with 4.3% of AIM 
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stocks and 4.3% of USM stocks.  Note that beyond year 3, AIM and Main Market 
stocks do not have complete histories (recall that our IPO period ends in 2004 and we 
record outcomes up to end 2007 only), but calculating survival rates on the basis of 
the available data reveals that 11.8% of USM firms enter bankruptcy by the end of the 
5 years following listing, compared to 9.5% of AIM stocks and 3.6% of Main Market 
stocks.
10
  Finally, note that attrition rates continue to be substantial beyond the 5 year 
horizon, so to some extent these low returns might be reflective of market prices 
anticipating bankruptcy beyond the 5 year post-IPO cut-off.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 [Table 6 about here] 
Evidence on timing 
Our next tests investigate the timing issue.  Under both behavioural timing and 
pseudo-timing hypotheses, managers respond to movements in market prices.  Chan 
et al. (2007) run regressions of share repurchase activity on past market performance 
to test for evidence of market timing.  However, they investigate share repurchase 
decisions, where one might reasonably assume managers are able to respond fairly 
quickly to changes in market prices, provided a buy-back programme is in operation.  
The authors use monthly data to investigate their hypotheses, which seems entirely 
reasonable for buy-backs.  By contrast, the planning horizon for IPOs is likely to be 
far longer than a month.  Quite whether quarterly or annual data are more appropriate 
to investigate timing is debatable, but here we choose annual data.  If pseudo-timing 
exists, we should observe a positive relationship between IPO activity and past market 
performance.  IPO activity is proxied by two variables. The first is simply the relative 
number of IPOs in a particular year, tn .  This relative number of IPOs in year t is 
given by  )/(100 ttt MnIPOnn ×=  where tIPOn  is the number of IPOs in year t, and 
tMn  is number of listed firms in the market in the same year.  This proxies for the 
IPO activity in year t in terms of numbers.  The second activity measure is the relative 
market value of IPOs in the same year, tv .  The IPO relative value in year t is given 
                                                
10
 We suspect that were we to calculate full 5 year survival rates at end of 2009 for our 2003 and 2004 
IPOs, the number of AIM bankruptcies would be considerably higher. 
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by  )/(100 ttt MvIPOvv ×=  where tIPOv  is the value of all IPOs issued in year t, and 
tMv  is the total market capitalisation in the same year.  This second variable proxies 
for the IPO activity in year t in terms of value.  
 
Explanatory factors are the lagged dependent variable, average (excess) market return 
( tm ), the return on SMB ( tsmb ), and the return on HML ( thml ) for a given year. To 
investigate the issue, we run an OLS regression of the form: 
Dependent = function of lagged (Dependent, co-dependent, m, smb, hml) and Trend. 
The lagged dependent variables capture possible cyclical behaviour, while the trend 
captures the long term growth of the economy.  The other factors capture market 
timing.  SMB and HML factors are from Gregory and Michou (2007) and formed as 
described in Gregory, Harris and Michou (2001).  The regressions are run in two 
steps, a full model and a restricted model, and all are estimated using White (1980) 
corrected standard errors. 
 
The results are shown in Table 7, Panel A (with relative number as the dependent 
variable) and Table 7, Panel B (with relative value as the dependent variable).  The 
adjusted R-squared values are high, particularly for the relative number regression.  
Which lags are significant depends upon whether the relative number of IPOs or the 
relative value of IPOs are taken as the dependent variable, but both regressions 
indicate that both short term and long term cyclical impacts may be present.  
However, the interpretation of the nature and length of this cycle differs between the 
two regressions.  In terms of relative number regressions, both lagged market returns 
and lagged SMB returns are significant predictors of IPO activity, an effect consistent 
with the pseudo-timing hypothesis.  IPOs tend to be smaller firms, and our evidence 
indicates that more flotations take place when markets are performing strongly and 
smaller firms in particular are performing well.  The trend term in the Panel A 
regressions shows that there is a long term upward drift in IPO activity over time.  
Last, there is no evidence that HML influences the number of IPOs.  The Panel B 
regressions with relative value of IPOs as the dependent variable show a different 
dynamic in terms of the lagged variables compared to the relative number regressions. 
Although lagged market returns remain a significant predictor of IPO activity in value 
terms, the SMB factor now exhibits a negative relati
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at a 2 year lag.  This difference between relative number and relative value 
regressions is consistent with large IPOs tending to follow periods of smaller firm 
under-performance.  Last, there is a hint that lagged HML is positively related to IPO 
value, but this effect fails to be significant in the restricted regression.  Last, the 
relative value trend is positive, at least in the restricted regression.   
[Table 7  about here] 
 
Calendar time results 
As Chan et al. (2007, p.2684) state, a “key implication of pseudo-timing is that while 
abnormal performance may exist when measured in event time, this result should not 
exist when evaluated in calendar time”.  Accordingly, having shown that some form 
of market timing appears to be taking place in observed IPO activity, we now turn to 
the analysis of IPO portfolios formed in calendar time.  We employ two weighting 
schemes.  The first is a simple equal weighting, where in any month each firm that has 
experienced an IPO in the previous 12, 24, 36, 48 or 60 months is included in the 
portfolio, so that in any given month, t, the weight given to that firm is 1/Nt, where Nt 
is the number of firms in that portfolio in month t.  The second is a value weight, 
where each firm is weighted according to its market capitalisation, Mi,t, at the time of 
the initial IPO.  The weight given to any firm in month t is therefore: 
, ,1
/
tN
i t j tj
M M
=∑  
Note that in both cases the benchmark return for the CTAR calculation is that IPO’s 
value-weighted size-control decile portfolio return.  Whether value-weighted CTARs 
or equally weighted CTARs are better specified is an empirical question that is yet to 
be resolved.  One feature of value-weighted calendar time abnormal returns that has 
not been discussed in the literature is that in markets with an expected positive return 
and dividend payout rates of less than 100%, value-weighted abnormal returns will 
tend to place more weight on recent issues in the portfolio of CTARs.  To see this, 
first assume that IPOs (or any other event of interest) occur randomly through time.  
A priori, in, say, the 60 month CTAR portfolio, the weights given to IPOs in the past 
12 months will be 12/60, the weight to IPOs in the past 13-24 months 12/60, and so 
on.  However, positive expected nominal returns and less than 100% payout rates 
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imply that the market capitalisations of all firms rise through time, partly through an 
inflation effect and partly through a real expected rate of return effect.  The 
consequence is that on average, weights will no longer be evenly distributed through 
time even if the IPOs themselves are, because more recent IPOs will tend to have 
higher market capitalisations than older IPOs.  Of course, if IPOs are not randomly 
distributed through time then the weighting for any individual 12 monthly period may 
not be 12/60, but the argument that recent IPOs have greater weight in the value 
weighted portfolio than the equally weighted one will still hold.  In our portfolios this 
is indeed the case.  The weightings to up to 12 months through to 48 to 60 month 
portfolios  for the equally-weighted CTARs are, respectively, 29.5%, 21.6%, 18.5%, 
15.4% and 15%, whilst those for the value-weighted scheme are, respectively, 32.3%, 
22%, 17.5%, 14.5% and 13.8%.  This matters if abnormal returns occur at a non-
linear rate through time.  The BHARs reported in Table 2 suggest that the rate of 
abnormal return is at its smallest in the first 12 months – indeed, the first 6 months 
show a positive return.  A second issue with value-weighted returns is that they are 
less likely to detect abnormal performance if this is concentrated in smaller firms 
(Chan et al., 2007; Loughran and Ritter, 2000). 
 
Turning to the results themselves, in Table 8 we present results using the basic CTAR 
method described in Lyon et al. (1999) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000).  Panel A 
shows the results from the equally-weighted portfolio.  Monthly returns are 
significantly negative for all periods beyond 12 months. For the 24 and 36 month 
returns are -0.50% and -0.48% respectively.  For the 48 month period returns are -
0.37% per month, and after 60 months returns they are a significant -0.41% per 
month.  The negative abnormal returns implied by the CTAR method are actually 
greater than those from the value-weighted benchmark BHAR returns for 24 and 36 
month horizons, which does not support a pseudo-timing argument.  However, the 
CTAR returns suggest that the rate of under-performance in IPOs slows somewhat 
after 36 months, a result also found in an earlier investigation of UK IPOs in 
Espenlaub et al. (2000).  The conclusion from the equally-weighted CTAR analysis 
seems clear – the under-performance of IPOs is real enough, supportive of a Loughran 
and Ritter (2000) behavioural timing explanation of IPOs, and not the result of 
“pseudo-timing”.  When we conduct the same analysis using value-weighting, 
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reported in Panel B of Table 8, the results are simply insignificant.  At least two 
explanations are possible for this divergence between equally-weighted and value-
weighted returns.  The first is that abnormal returns are concentrated in smaller firms.  
For the US, Brav and Gompers (1997) show that under-performance is concentrated 
in smaller non-venture capital backed IPOs.  However, this is not entirely consistent 
with earlier evidence for the UK.  Espenlaub et al. (2000, Table 2) find that although 
underperformance is concentrated in the low deciles, the very worst decile for IPO 
performance is the largest.
11
  We show below that size is indeed a major factor 
influencing these value-weighted calendar time returns.   
[Table 8 about here] 
 
One problem with the basic CTAR analysis is that it relies on simple t-tests and also 
assumes that the portfolio of firms undertaking an IPO has exactly the same risk as 
the benchmark.  As we argue above, better tests are available.  Accordingly, in Table 
9, we run the regression model implied by (4) above, employing White (1980) 
corrected robust standard errors.  We also disaggregate our results showing Main 
Market, AIM and USM stocks separately.  Panel A shows the results for the equally-
weighted portfolio, which are broadly consistent with those from the basic CTAR 
method, except for the fact that results are somewhat more negative and generally 
more significant.  The intercept terms, or “alphas”, look close to the monthly 
abnormal returns from Table 2 Panel B, and are always highly significant.  The beta 
on the benchmark portfolios is on average slightly above one for the portfolio 
formation periods, but never significantly different from one for any individual 
formation period.  Finally the adjusted R-squared figures suggest that the implied 
model of expected returns performs reasonably well in explaining the cross-section of 
observed returns.  Taken as a whole, these results strengthen the picture painted by the 
CTARs in Table 8, Panel A.  There again appears to be no support for a “pseudo-
timing” explanation of IPO returns.  However, once again the value-weighted CTARs, 
reported in Panel B, yield abnormal returns that are wholly insignificant for all 
markets combined.  Whilst the betas on the control portfolios are not too different 
from the equally weighted case,   the standard errors of those betas have increased and 
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 Although they note that these are a small number of observations in this group.  Nonetheless, the 
median abnormal return of these 8 firms is not supportive of an “outlier” effect. 
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the adjusted R-squared figures are well below those of the equally weighted CTAR 
model for all portfolio formation periods, suggesting that a value-weighted model 
does a poorer job of explaining the cross-section of returns than an equally weighted 
model. 
 [Table 9 about here] 
 
Breaking the IPO market down into sub-categories, we see that in general the equally-
weighted calendar time results confirm the results from the BHAR analysis in Tables 
3-5.  Note, though, that the 60 month CTAR for the Main Market is significantly 
negative at the 5% level which contradicts the BHAR result based on a value-
weighted benchmark, though not those based on either the equally-weighted or size-
matched benchmarks.  The results for AIM are unambiguous, and confirm longer 
horizon returns are significantly negative, although the scale of longer run under-
performance is less than that under the BHAR metric.  This is not altogether 
surprising, in that the CTAR method, as a single-period portfolio formation device, 
necessarily drops out those firms that are no longer available for investment.  As a 
consequence, any calendar time portfolio that has substantial bankruptcies will tend to 
exhibit higher returns than an equivalent event time portfolio.  Betas are significantly 
greater than unity, suggesting that AIM IPOs are, on average, riskier than a simple 
size adjusted benchmark would suggest.  USM stocks have more mixed results in 
calendar time.  The 24 and 60 month portfolios exhibit significant negative abnormal 
returns, but other portfolios are not significantly negative.  However, whilst the value-
weighted calendar time results for other markets are not significantly different from 
zero, for the USM they are.  This suggests that size effects played out rather 
differently in the USM compared to other markets. 
 
Our final GLS regressions are shown in Table 10.  Panel A of the table shows the 
results from equally-weighting firms in the IPO calendar time portfolio.  First, by 
comparing these results with those in Table 9 Panel A we can see that the GLS model 
does indeed appear to add to a simple White-corrected OLS model of abnormal 
returns, and that this is true for all the sub-portfolios.  Furthermore, the results with 
respect to the significance of the under-performance of IPOs are strengthened.  For all 
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markets combined, there is a marginal increase in the under-performance of  IPOs, but 
the significance is greater.  All horizons, including the 12 month horizon, are now 
significantly below zero.  Turning to the sub-analysis by market, the most striking 
difference between these results and the previous ones is that the Main Market returns 
are now significantly negative at the 24, 36 and 60 month horizons.  Note that the 
scale of the abnormal returns is not very different from the Table 3 or Table 9 results 
but the abnormal returns are now significant, varying between -0.2% and -0.3% per 
month.  AIM and USM results are both unambiguously negative under this method, 
with the size of the alphas being consistent with serious under-performance of 
between -0.8% and -1.5% per month for AIM, depending on the horizon, and -1.1% 
and -1.4% per month for USM stocks. 
 
However, on a value-weighted basis, consistent with the results in Table 9, the results 
are generally insignificant, with only the USM recording significant negative 
abnormal returns, as in Table 9. 
 
 [Table 10 about here] 
 
Returns by relative size and type 
Given the large differences between value and equally weighted returns in calendar 
time, we now turn to a sub-analysis of the BHAR results which divides the sample 
according to the relative size of the IPO.  It is important to classify IPOs by relative 
rather than absolute size because of the enormous changes in market capitalisation 
between the early and later years of our sample.  To classify IPOs, break-points were 
obtained as follows.  We first calculated the relative value of a given IPO by dividing 
its market value at issue by the total market capitalisation of all firms in January of 
that year.  This produces the size of the IPO relative to its current market.  We then 
divided IPOs into five quintiles.  The smallest quintile (Q1) includes IPOs whose 
value was less than 0.0005% of the total market capitalisation at the time of issue, 
while the largest quintile (Q5) includes IPOs whose value was greater than or equal to 
0.05% of the total market capitalisation.  The resultant distribution is shown in the 
first panel of Table 11.  Whilst any such categorisation may be viewed as somewhat 
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arbitrary, the figures clearly show that the majority of our IPOs fall into the middle 
quintile, with the smallest proportion (3.6%) in the largest quintile.  Means and 
medians are not that different from each other in Q1-Q4, but are very different in 
Q5.
12
    
 
Our tests of the effect of size and market on BHAR are reported in the lower panels of 
Table 11.  In these regressions, BHAR is regressed on four size dummies, one for 
each quintile, with the intercept capturing the lowest quintile performance, and further 
dummies for AIM and USM.  Although adjusted R-squared values are somewhat 
disappointing, we can see that the general impression from Tables 3-5 shows up in the 
regressions.  Controlling for AIM and USM stocks, BHARs increase with relative 
size, all the way through to Q5, and the increases are significant.  The implication is 
that controlling for AIM and USM effects, relatively large IPOs have positive 
abnormal returns whilst small IPOs have negative abnormal returns.  The results also 
show that whilst USM, net of any size effects, does not yield results significantly 
different from zero, the strong implication of these Table 11 regressions is that USM 
IPOs had significantly negative abnormal returns even after size has been controlled 
for.  For example, the coefficients imply that on an equally weighted basis, simply by 
being listed on the USM, the average IPO will under-perform by an additional 76% 
after 3 years, and that even on a value-weighted basis this effect is -68% after 3 years. 
 [Table 11 about here] 
Conclusion 
Our results clearly show that in event time, IPOs under-perform, and under-perform 
significantly.  We place most emphasis on the performance measured relative to our 
value-weighted control portfolios, and under that metric IPOs under-perform by 
around 12.6% after three years and by 31.6% after 5 years.  Under-performance is 
greater when either equally-weighted control portfolios are used as the benchmark, or 
when a matched-firm approach is used.  Under the pseudo-timing hypothesis of 
Schultz (2003), such observed under-performance of IPOs in event time ex post is not 
indicative of under-performance ex ante, and he argues strongly in favour of calendar 
time portfolio tests.  A calendar time portfolio test amounts to investing a fixed 
                                                
12
 It is perhaps worth noting that large IPOs in this quintile include such well-known firms such as 
Wellcome, Vodafone, Norwich Union and Orange. 
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amount of cash in IPO portfolios each month.  The arguments and simulations used 
by Schultz do not require any particular weighting scheme for these calendar time 
portfolios, and neither do his US results appear to be sensitive to the choice of 
weighting. We examine results using both equally weighted returns and value-
weighted returns in calendar time.   
 
Whilst it is clear from our analysis that timing effects exist, the equally weighted 
calendar time results lead us towards dismissing a pseudo-timing explanation of IPOs.  
These CTARs are indicative of substantial under-performance of IPOs, which is not 
compatible with a pseudo-timing hypothesis.  In contrast, our results are in keeping 
with the behavioural timing hypothesis of Loughran and Ritter (2000).  Using the 
simple CTAR approach of Lyon et al. (1999) we show strong under-performance for 
all horizons up to 60 months post IPO.  More complex analyses using a regression 
framework which controls for heteroscedasticity show significant under-performance 
of between -0.6% and -0.7% per month after 36 months, and between -0.5% and -
0.6% per month after 60 months depending on whether a robust standard errors OLS 
or a GLS approach is used.  These figures are in line with those implied by the BHAR 
approach.  It is only when we value-weight these CTARs that we are unable to detect 
any abnormal performance.  This does not, in our view, support a pseudo-timing 
argument; rather, it is indicative of under-performance being associated with smaller 
IPOs.  Breaking down these results by market suggests that whether main market 
IPOs under-perform is somewhat sensitive to the metric employed.  There is tentative 
evidence of under-performance using some benchmarks in event time, and definite 
evidence of under performance in calendar time.  However, it is clear that this under-
performance is less than that observed is AIM and USM markets, both of which 
exhibit highly significant under-performance.  The other major result is that size plays 
an important part in determining the success of an IPO.  Large IPOs outperform small 
IPOs, although even when size is allowed for, USM IPO stocks significantly under-
perform all other IPO stocks. 
 
Of course, there are the usual caveats that our results are contingent upon the correct 
risk-adjusted benchmarks being employed in the analysis.  Here, we have employed 
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size-decile controls and size-matched firm controls.  Some might argue for different 
matching procedures.  We favour size-controls rather than, say, size and book-to-
market controls, for three reasons.  The first two are theoretical.  First, there is a 
growing body of evidence (Gregory et al., 2001; Al-Horani et al., 2003; Michou et al., 
2007; Gregory and Michou, 2009) that suggests UK returns may not be entirely 
captured by either a Fama-French model or a model based on Fama-French style 
portfolios.  Second, as Loughran and Ritter (2000) observe, if behavioural timing does 
occur, then more powerful tests result from using size-control portfolios than using 
size and book-to-market portfolios.  Our third reason for choosing size-matching is 
pragmatic, in that it enables us to use the largest possible number of IPO and control 
firms, and avoids any possible survivorship biases affecting our results.  Obviously, it 
is essential to properly match the risk of IPO firms and their benchmarks, and there is 
room for debate about how this should be done.  Nonetheless, it is difficult to see how 
the scale of the underperformance we record for AIM and USM stocks can be 
attributed to a “bad model” problem.  
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Table 1: IPOs on the UK official list by the year of issue (1975-2004) and the 
total market capitalisation of all issues at the time of entering the market for 
each year. 
LSPD 
Class 
& G8  
Year 
Plac-
ing 
(53) 
Offers 
 for sale 
(54) 
Tenders 
 
(55) 
Sub- 
Scription 
(56) 
Placing  
& open  
Offer 
(71) 
Placing &  
interme- 
diaries  
offer (72) 
Placing  
& offer  
for sale 
(73) 
Total Total  
Market  
Cap. 
(£m) 
1975 1 1      2 3 
1976  1      1 30 
1977 3 2      5 43 
1978 2 8      10 108 
1979 2 3 2     7 329 
1980 5 6 1 2    14 131 
1981 29 13 2 3    47 1285 
1982 25 4 3 3    35 3126 
1983 55 15 22 2    94 1846 
1984 74 26 8 2    110 14418 
1985 73 38 8 2    121 3158 
1986 86 46 5 2    139 14071 
1987 113 21  1    135 7583 
1988 115 18  2   1 136 7563 
1989 73 13      86 8035 
1990 15 13  1   1 30 8469 
1991 7 8  1   1 17 9152 
1992 26 0  1    27 4648 
1993 83 1  3  1 1 89 7501 
1994 105 2 1   6 4 118 13522 
1995 58 4      62 5406 
1996 143 5  1 1 5 5 160 17844 
1997 110 6   1  9 126 17788 
1998 66 2     2 70 7624 
1999 79 5   3  1 88 38404 
2000 200 12   3  20 235 29754 
2001 88 7   1  10 106 7754 
2002 58 3   2  10 73 13323 
2003 70 2   1  4 77 7736 
2004 269 3   1  6 279 22596 
Total 2033 288 52 26 13 12 75 2499 273250 
Note: Initial public offerings include offers for sale at fixed price, placement, offers for sale 
by tenders, and subscriptions.  Investment trusts, financial trusts, banks, and over investment 
firms are excluded.  The entire population is based on 2932 issues, 433 are excluded and the 
sample is 2499 firms is issued during the period 1975-2004.  All classifications are based 
upon the LSPD G8 codes. 
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Table 6: Proportions of “bankrupt” firms in the sample of Main Market, AIM and 
USM IPOs respectively 
Market Percentage 
liquidating within 3 
years 
Percentage 
liquidating 
within 5 
years 
Main 1.2% 3.6% 
AIM 4.3% 9.5% 
USM 4.3% 11.8% 
The table shows the cumulative percentage of firms in each market that have delisted 
for reasons that can be classified as “bankrupt”; this includes firms that enter 
receivership or are liquidated. 
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Table 7:  Regression results for the number and value of IPOs. 
 
Panel A: Relative number of IPOs regressions 
 Full Model Restricted Model 
 Coefficient t-statistic p-value Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Constant 0.085 0.09 0.927 0.590 0.673 0.501 
1−tn  -0.525 -2.67 0.008 -0.207 -1.925 0.054 
2−tn  0.027 0.23 0.821    
4−tn  0.317 2.09 0.037 0.232 1.854 0.064 
5−tn  -0.476 -3.16 0.002 -0.417 -3.017 0.003 
1−tv  0.409 1.00 0.319    
2−tv  1.284 2.80 0.005 1.092 2.995 0.003 
1−tm  110.316 4.83 0.000 110.723 4.453 0.000 
2−tm  48.909 1.56 0.120    
1−tsmb  191.258 5.02 0.000 187.678 4.918 0.000 
2−tsmb  7.071 0.14 0.891    
1−thml  30.813 1.19 0.233    
2−thml  0.087 0.00 0.998    
Trend ( t ) 0.259 4.64 0.000 0.225 5.089 0.000 
Adjusted 
2R  0.68   0.75   
 
Panel B: Relative value of IPOs regressions 
 Full Model Restricted Model 
 Coefficient t-statistic p-value Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Constant 0.412 1.32 0.186 0.470 1.718 0.086 
1−tv  -0.227 -0.96 0.337    
2−tv  0.267 1.78 0.074 0.333 2.344 0.019 
4−tv  -0.479 -3.71 0.000 -0.495 -3.557 0.000 
5−tv  -0.104 -0.79 0.429    
1−tn  0.116 1.57 0.117    
2−tn  -0.008 -0.17 0.861    
1−tm  27.014 3.21 0.001 23.829 2.772 0.006 
2−tm  -5.468 -0.44 0.662    
1−tsmb  -4.726 -0.33 0.741    
2−tsmb  -52.764 -2.92 0.004 -22.722 -2.802 0.005 
1−thml  18.045 1.37 0.170    
2−thml  17.721 1.75 0.080 12.609 1.637 0.102 
Trend ( t ) 0.022 0.90 0.366 0.031 2.244 0.025 
Adjusted 
2R  0.09   0.35   
Dependent variables are the relative number of IPOs (nt) and the relative value of IPOs (vt) in Panels A 
and B respectively.  Independent variables are the lagged values of these variables, together with 
lagged values for the return on the market (mt), and the other Fama-French factors (smbt and hmlt) 
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Table 8: Calendar Time Abnormal Returns (CTAR) from a size-control 
benchmark 
 
Panel A: Equally weighted CTAR     
Holding Period  Mean CTAR t-stat p-value 
 Main, AIM, and USM 
12 -0.0019 -0.8570 0.3920 
24 -0.0050 -3.0483 0.0025 
36 -0.0048 -3.2683 0.0012 
48 -0.0037 -2.6180 0.0092 
60 -0.0041 -3.0077 0.0028 
 
Panel B: Value weighted CTAR     
Holding Period  mean t-stat p-value 
 Main, AIM, and USM 
12 0.0051 1.5671 0.1180 
24 0.0034 1.2722 0.2041 
36 0.0028 1.2206 0.2230 
48 0.0027 1.3380 0.1817 
60 0.0021 1.1266 0.2606 
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Table 9: Robust (White 1980 Corrected) OLS regressions of IPO Calendar Time 
Returns on Size-Control Benchmark Return, with sub-market analysis 
  
Panel A: Equally weighted portfolios 
   
Holding Period Alpha Beta AdjR2 
 Main, AIM and USM 
12 -0.003 1.111 61.7 
(t-stat) -1.562 13.153  
24 -0.006 1.103 74.1 
(t-stat) -3.715 21.304  
36 -0.006 1.089 77.6 
(t-stat) -3.989 23.484  
48 -0.005 1.093 78.8 
(t-stat) -3.450 25.684  
60 -0.005 1.085 79.6 
(t-stat) -3.857 26.509  
 Main  
12 -0.001 1.053 60.9 
(t-stat) -0.535 19.153  
24 -0.002 1.102 73.9 
(t-stat) -1.475 26.979  
36 -0.002 1.086 78.5 
(t-stat) -1.464 29.964  
48 -0.002 1.074 79.5 
(t-stat) -1.251 31.573  
60 -0.003 1.061 80.6 
(t-stat) -2.120 33.420  
 AIM 
12 -0.011 1.728 62.1 
(t-stat) -2.541 5.965  
24 -0.014 1.500 70.9 
(t-stat) -3.285 8.906  
36 -0.010 1.493 73.1 
(t-stat) -2.774 9.322  
48 -0.008 1.499 76.0 
(t-stat) -2.390 11.060  
60 -0.007 1.526 75.0 
(t-stat) -2.134 9.789  
 USM 
12 -0.010 0.882 17.7 
(t-stat) -1.310 7.558  
24 -0.018 0.892 10.6 
(t-stat) -1.718 6.432  
36 -0.011 0.837 11.5 
(t-stat) -1.296 6.724  
48 -0.008 0.991 27.5 
(t-stat) -1.510 11.778  
60 -0.009 1.000 41.2 
(t-stat) -2.201 17.121  
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Panel B: Value weighted portfolios   
Holding Period Alpha Beta AdjR2 
 Main, AIM and USM 
12 0.004 1.108 43.1 
(t-stat) 1.407 14.350  
24 0.002 1.209 55.7 
(t-stat) 0.719 17.737  
36 0.001 1.168 61.1 
(t-stat) 0.695 21.588  
48 0.002 1.155 65.8 
(t-stat) 0.802 23.913  
60 0.001 1.139 68.1 
(t-stat) 0.605 25.344  
 Main 
12 0.005 1.116 44.8 
(t-stat) 1.524 15.512  
24 0.004 1.226 56.5 
(t-stat) 1.423 18.097  
36 0.003 1.172 61.4 
(t-stat) 1.254 21.501  
48 0.003 1.146 66.4 
(t-stat) 1.371 24.194  
60 0.002 1.130 68.5 
(t-stat) 1.110 25.691  
 AIM  
12 0.018 2.260 25.7 
(t-stat) 1.551 2.934  
24 0.001 2.346 35.1 
(t-stat) 0.061 3.683  
36 -0.002 2.330 45.4 
(t-stat) -0.239 4.665  
48 -0.001 2.228 50.4 
(t-stat) -0.127 5.645  
60 0.000 2.234 50.9 
(t-stat) -0.071 5.431  
 USM 
12 -0.008 1.012 18.9 
(t-stat) -1.015 7.525  
24 -0.026 1.093 11.2 
(t-stat) -2.233 7.310  
36 -0.012 1.081 13.5 
(t-stat) -1.223 7.779  
48 -0.009 1.186 25.0 
(t-stat) -1.236 11.977  
60 -0.011 1.147 37.9 
(t-stat) -2.148 13.406  
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Table 10: GLS regressions of IPO Calendar Time Returns on Size-Control 
Benchmark Return, with sub-market analysis  
  
Panel A: Equally weightedpPortfolios   
    
Holding Period Alpha Beta AdjR2 
 Main, AIM and USM 
12 -0.006 1.198 68.5 
(t-stat) -3.020 13.461  
24 -0.008 1.161 79.0 
(t-stat) -5.098 20.811  
36 -0.007 1.163 83.4 
(t-stat) -4.994 22.273  
48 -0.005 1.173 85.4 
(t-stat) -4.126 24.698  
60 -0.006 1.168 87.1 
(t-stat) -4.947 26.391  
 Main  
12 -0.002 1.105 72.0 
(t-stat) -1.004 22.255  
24 -0.003 1.129 79.9 
(t-stat) -2.300 27.562  
36 -0.002 1.125 85.9 
(t-stat) -2.059 33.912  
48 -0.002 1.126 87.9 
(t-stat) -1.709 38.105  
60 -0.003 1.120 89.9 
(t-stat) -3.199 43.568  
 AIM 
12 -0.011 1.718 62.4 
(t-stat) -2.649 6.081  
24 -0.015 1.487 71.8 
(t-stat) -3.825 9.375  
36 -0.010 1.492 73.2 
(t-stat) -2.856 9.365  
48 -0.008 1.499 76.9 
(t-stat) -2.671 11.235  
60 -0.008 1.522 76.2 
(t-stat) -2.538 10.117  
 USM 
12 -0.012 0.981 51.7 
(t-stat) -3.563 12.959  
24 -0.014 0.975 57.5 
(t-stat) -5.595 19.286  
36 -0.014 0.928 42.2 
(t-stat) -4.987 18.174  
48 -0.012 1.000 45.4 
(t-stat) -3.547 17.908  
60 -0.011 1.003 50.4 
(t-stat) -3.600 20.032  
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Panel B: Value weighted portfolios    
    
Holding Period Alpha Beta AdjR2 
 Main, AIM and USM 
12 0.002 1.202 45.1 
(t-stat) 0.685 13.887  
24 0.001 1.282 57.4 
(t-stat) 0.287 17.482  
36 0.001 1.247 63.3 
(t-stat) 0.268 21.778  
48 0.001 1.221 68.2 
(t-stat) 0.439 25.194  
60 0.000 1.209 71.1 
(t-stat) 0.090 27.559  
 Main  
12 0.004 1.198 48.1 
(t-stat) 1.203 14.973  
24 0.003 1.277 58.5 
(t-stat) 1.054 18.117  
36 0.002 1.234 64.3 
(t-stat) 0.889 22.401  
48 0.002 1.211 70.1 
(t-stat) 0.910 26.449  
60 0.001 1.189 72.1 
(t-stat) 0.631 29.042  
 AIM 
12 0.014 2.157 26.3 
(t-stat) 1.262 3.230  
24 0.001 2.372 35.0 
(t-stat) 0.150 3.622  
36 0.000 2.354 44.7 
(t-stat) 0.065 4.570  
48 0.001 2.226 49.4 
(t-stat) 0.104 5.605  
60 0.000 2.237 50.4 
(t-stat) 0.032 5.391  
 USM 
12 -0.011 1.106 42.4 
(t-stat) -2.389 10.340  
24 -0.020 1.172 41.8 
(t-stat) -4.780 14.358  
36 -0.016 1.120 31.3 
(t-stat) -3.445 14.078  
48 -0.008 1.185 23.4 
(t-stat) -1.052 11.394  
60 -0.011 1.147 37.7 
(t-stat) -2.099 13.343  
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Table 11: IPO firms by relative size. 
 
Panel A: Break points and summary statistics of relative size.  
   
 
 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Definition <0.0005 >=0.0005 
<0.001 
>=0.001 
<0.01 
>=0.01 
<0.05 
>=0.05 
Proportion of 
total 
13.5% 10.1% 56.7% 16.1% 3.6% 
Mean  (%) 0.000268 0.000736 0.003886 0.019744 0.147976 
Median (%) 0.000269 0.000704 0.003179 0.016316 0.083013 
Min (%) 0.000017 0.000506 0.001011 0.010000 0.050723 
Max (%) 0.000496 0.000991 0.009989 0.049732 0.807861 
 
Panel B: Regression results of performance on size and market segments. 
 
Holding 
Period 
 ß1 ß2 ß3 ß4 ß5 ß6 ß7 R-sq  
 
  Equally Weighted Benchmark 
12 Coefficient -0.44 0.27 0.41 0.66 0.47 0.06 -0.12   
 T-stat -7.75 3.92 7.40 10.27 5.20 1.55 -2.57 0.06  
36 Coefficient -1.12 0.77 1.06 1.48 1.25 -0.06 -0.76   
 T-stat -6.08 3.40 5.92 7.34 4.61 -0.52 -5.74 0.06  
60 Coefficient -2.34 1.24 2.14 2.36 2.27 -0.12 -1.21   
 T-stat -7.77 3.25 7.12 7.34 5.67 -0.53 -7.15 0.08  
  Value Weighted Benchmark 
12 Coefficient -0.32 0.20 0.28 0.53 0.35 0.03 -0.11   
 T-stat -5.66 2.88 5.19 8.22 3.90 0.78 -2.44 0.04  
36 Coefficient -0.59 0.45 0.54 0.93 0.73 -0.17 -0.68   
 T-stat -3.23 2.00 3.03 4.65 2.74 -1.44 -5.19 0.04  
60 Coefficient -0.98 0.68 0.86 0.99 0.93 -0.33 -0.99   
 T-stat -3.46 1.88 3.05 3.26 2.47 -1.60 -6.22 0.04  
 
Break-points were obtained as follows. We first calculate the relative value of a given IPO by dividing 
its market value at issue by the total market capitalisation of that year. This will give us the size of the 
IPO relative to its current market. We then divide IPOs into five quintiles. The smallest quintile (Q1) 
includes IPOs whose value is less than 0.0005% of the total market capitalisation (at the time of issue), 
while the largest quintile (Q5) includes IPOs whose value is greater than or equal to 0.05% of the total 
market capitalisation. 
Using these breakpoints, we then run the following regression, with BHARs from equally weighted and 
value weighted benchmarks respectively: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 72 3 4 5BHAR D D D D AIM USMβ β β β β β β= + + + + + +  
 
Where D2 to D5 are dummies for size. For example, D3 equals 1 for firms belonging to the third 
quintile and zero otherwise. The intercept accounts for the lowest size. AIM and USM are dummies for 
USM and AIM companies respectively.  
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Appendix 1. LSPD codes and descriptions of type of delisting. 
 
Code Description 
5 Acquisition/takeover/merger 
6 Suspension/cancellation with shares acquired later. Meanwhile, may be 
traded under rule 163(2) 
7 Liquidation (usually valueless, but there may be liquidation payments) 
8 Quotation cancelled (maybe suspended initially) as company becomes a 
private company, or there is insufficient trading in the shares. Dealings 
continue under rule 163(2) or (3)  
9 As for 8, but no dealings under rule 163 
10 Quotation suspended – if suspended for more than three years, this may lead 
to automatic cancellation 
11 Voluntary liquidation, where value remains and was / is being distributed 
12 Changed to foreign registration 
13 Quotation cancelled for reason unknown. Dealings continue under rule 
163(2) or (3) 
14 As for 13, but no dealings under rule 163 
15 Converted into an alternative security for the same company 
16 Receiver appointed/liquidation. Probably valueless, but not yet certain 
17 Unitisation of an investment or financial trust 
18 Nationalisation 
19 Enfranchisement 
20 In Administration/Administrative receivership 
21 Cancelled and assumed valueless 
Source: LSPD manual handbook 2006. This table represents the type of death (G10) in the 
LSPD manual, which indicates to the reason why the security ceased to be in the SEDOL. 
 
